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INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 1933, when Adolf A. Berle penned his review of 
Recent Social Trends, quoted in this Article’s title, the U.S. economy had 
disintegrated with a quarter of the nation’s workforce unemployed and 
gross domestic product (GDP) plummeting nearly fifty percent since 
1929.1 The banking system nearly ceased to function and deflation drove 
prices down by twenty-five percent.2 Times of uncertainty and panic 
require explanation and action grounded in an understanding of the nature 
of the problem at hand. Berle’s argument in 1933—“In time of stress, a 
civilization pauses to take stock of itself”—applied more than once in the 
period during which Berle rose to prominence in the WWI era and when 
he wrote his review in 1933.3 This Article considers the period beginning 
when Berle left the U.S. Army after his service with the American 
Commission to Negotiate the Peace in Paris in June of 1919 and follows 
important aspects of his career and thinking up to the arrival of Berle and 
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Gardiner Means’s classic study, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, and the election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
By focusing on this relatively narrow but rich and tumultuous period 
in Berle’s life and U.S. history, I aim to develop a broader context that 
might help us to better understand the era in which Berle and Means 
conducted the research and puzzled out the ideas that would be central to 
their collective effort to “take stock” of the American corporation in The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property. The Berle that appears in these 
pages comes into his own in the era of the “associational state,” which, I 
argue, helps to explain his early ambivalence about expanding the power 
of the government in corporate affairs during the early years of the Great 
Depression. A focus on this early period in his career, I suggest in the 
conclusion, also sheds light on Berle’s evolving understanding of the role 
of the corporation in American society after WWII. 
As will be described below, this was a remarkable period in 
American history. Berle’s career began in the highly uncertain years 
following WWI. The first section below sets the stage by considering how 
economic instability, labor–capital conflict, racial violence, and the impact 
of the war itself combined to reveal how little policymakers and leaders in 
and out of government knew about rapid changes underway in American 
society. Berle was particularly well suited for a time when many people 
wanted to “know” what was going on. As is outlined in the second section, 
he was a quick (and confident) study and had a knack for constructing 
narratives that described complex situations, and he always wanted to be 
in the mix when it came time to propose a potential course of action.4 A 
supply of experts or potential “knowers” and a set of public problems 
required institutions and individuals who could coordinate and fund 
inquiry. The third section describes how, in this period, new institutions 
emerged bent on providing an empirical basis for understanding change. 
Berle made a name for himself as a public intellectual in an era when major 
foundations and philanthropists funded some of the most important 
nonprofit and nongovernmental institutions in this period, and the federal 
government—often at the behest of Secretary of Commerce and future 
president Herbert Hoover—looked to the work done by these relatively 
new institutions to address pressing public problems. Berle, Means, and 
many others benefited directly from these efforts. The fourth section and 
the conclusion consider Berle’s effort in the New Era and the early years 
of the Great Depression—that is to say prior to FDR coming into office—
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to try to come to terms with what the nation might do to address the 
immense power gathered up by the modern corporation. 
This Article demonstrates three things. First, an examination of 
Berle’s work and thinking in this critical period reveals the ways in which 
public problems and the need to “know capitalism,” to borrow a phrase 
from Mary Furner, converged in the post-WWI era in remarkable and 
unprecedented ways that would shape New Deal and post-New Deal 
politics and policy. Berle’s gift for synthesizing evidence and constructing 
narratives that explained complex events were particularly well suited to 
this era that prized the expert.5 Second, identifying a problem and 
developing a persuasive narrative is one thing, but finding solutions is 
another. Berle joined in a collective effort to “grope”—to use a term he 
employed often—for new ways of ordering the relationship between the 
state, shareholders, managers, workers, and the corporation. In a related 
and third point, a close examination of this critical period in Berle’s 
intellectual development helps us to better understand Berle’s embrace of 
the corporation as a progressive and stabilizing force in the post-WWII 
era. The Berle of the pre-New Deal period was ideologically predisposed 
to more associational—rather than statist—solutions to public problems. 
As the Great Depression took hold, Berle recognized the necessity of 
government taking on new powers, but his correspondence and writings 
prior to the Roosevelt administration reveal someone never at ease with 
precisely how the state should regulate the corporation.6 When post-WWII 
concerns about the inevitable return to the Great Depression failed to 
materialize, Berle returned to this more associational approach and 
celebrated the ensuing prosperity as a victory for now socially responsible 
corporate managers who had taken the lessons of the Great Depression to 
heart. 
I. UNREST AND UNCERTAINTY:  
THE UNITED STATES IN THE POST-WWI ERA 
WWI had a profound effect not only on the men and women serving 
in the military but also on domestic life, where President Woodrow 
Wilson’s calls to make “the world safe for democracy” infused everyday 
life with new meaning.7 Wartime service led many American workers to 
demand some measure of industrial democracy in workplaces where 
concentrated economic power left many citizens without a voice in 
determining the conditions and terms under which they labored. The labor 
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market tightened as immigration plummeted and hundreds of thousands of 
American workers left their jobs to fight. At the same time the draft 
swelled the size of the American Expeditionary Force, American industry 
ramped up production to support the nation’s troops and allies. As 
unemployment plummeted, hundreds of thousands of women, African 
Americans, and Mexican and Mexican–American workers entered the 
ranks of the manufacturing workforce to support the war effort abroad.8 
When American men and women went shopping during the war, they were 
asked—and sometimes ordered or coerced by government officials or even 
their neighbors—to conserve food and other resources to nourish the 
troops. When they went to their local bank or post office, Uncle Sam 
encouraged them to buy war bonds to finance the effort.9 
After the war, many workers and mustered-out soldiers demanded 
that the benefits of democracy extend to their communities and 
workplaces. But employers saw the end of the war and the pullback of 
statist war-time policies as an opportunity to attack gains made by workers 
and unions during the war. Post-war economic turmoil made this a less 
than ideal time for workers and unions to make such demands. As the war 
wound to a close, workers and employers benefited from high demand for 
consumer goods at home and an increase in demand for U.S. goods in war-
ravaged Europe, but the prosperity was short-lived and followed by 
skyrocketing levels of inflation.10 To make matters worse, as mustered-out 
troops returned home, cancelled government contracts shrank demand and 
contributed to increasing levels of unemployment. Employers mercilessly 
exercised their post-war leverage and slashed wages and drove out many 
unions that had made inroads during the war. American workers responded 
by walking off the job by the millions.11 Americans during and after the 
war turned on each other as well. In East St. Louis in 1917, white invaders 
killed at least two-hundred African American residents, and in 1919 race 
riots broke out in Charleston, Washington D.C., Chicago, and beyond. 
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Lynching increased as well. In 1919 alone, white mobs lynched seventy-
six African Americans, including ten veterans, some in their U.S. military 
uniforms.12 
The “Great Unrest” that followed the war came about at the precise 
moment when a number of intellectuals, experts, and investigators realized 
how starkly unprepared the federal government was to even make sense 
of these problems, much less to solve them. During the war, the Wilson 
administration mobilized leaders in academia, business, and labor to lead 
and participate in an array of temporary government agencies ranging 
from the widely known and studied War Industries Board and National 
War Labor Board to less heralded efforts by organizations such as the 
Woman-In-Industry Services and the Division of Negro Economics.13 This 
process, as Robert D. Cuff described it, of applying “private knowledge to 
public problems” in the context of war resulted in a fairly successful effort 
to mobilize the nation’s people and economy, but it also revealed 
enormous limitations in the institutional capacity of the American state.14 
This became particularly clear to leaders such as Edwin Gay, Wesley 
Mitchell, and others who took wartime positions in federal government. 
Speaking for the group, Mitchell wrote that they had “learned from hard 
experience how inadequate was their equipment for dealing with the 
problems put up to them.”15 
An expansion of the power, capacity, and capability of the federal 
government provided one potential path to addressing the many vexing 
problems the nation confronted coming out of the war. And to a degree, 
during the 1920s, Republican leaders like Department of Commerce 
Secretary Herbert Hoover did expand the size and scope of government. 
But they did so, as Ellis Hawley has long argued, through an associational 
state model that stressed a role for the government as a sort of information 
clearing house that would allow the private sector and non-state civil 
institutions to make informed decisions that advanced the public interest. 
Associational leaders like Hoover accepted the modern corporation and 
viewed it as a source of stability in the economy. They sought to facilitate 
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information sharing by businesses in order to coordinate production levels 
and set prices and to prevent what they saw as inefficient and wasteful 
competition. Advocates of the associational state aimed, as one historian 
has described it, to “provide a ‘middle way’ between statist collectivism 
and laissez-faire individualism.”16 Advocates of the associational state 
facilitated efforts by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 
Federated American Engineering Societies, and other non-government 
institutions—more often than not non-profits—to join or work in 
conjunction with the Department of Commerce in studying and 
understanding the state of the nation.17 
It was in this environment and, importantly, this intellectual and 
ideological climate that Berle began his public career. He seemed 
particularly well suited to operate in an era that prized the expert or the 
technocrat’s ability to gather information and data and then construct a 
narrative that explained complicated changes underway. He had, as his 
biographer Jordan Schwarz noted, “a gift for acquiring expertise 
quickly.”18 He also had a knack for developing close relationships with 
people who could legitimize his ability as a public intellectual and expert. 
Berle worked quickly in the WWI era and the early 1920s to generate a 
public image as someone who could not just make sense of rapid changes 
underway but also propose solutions to public problems. The remedies he 
seemed most comfortable with fit the era nicely. As will be described 
below, in the early years of the Great Depression, Berle struggled to come 
to terms with what role the state should play in controlling and regulating 
the modern corporation; in fact, he was much more ideologically suited to 
the associational impulse that characterized New Era policy makers 
associated with Hoover. 
II. THEORY “WITHOUT CONTACT DOWN TOWN BECOMES THEOLOGY” 
Throughout his career, Berle argued for the necessity of connecting 
academic work to the world of politics, policy, and society. In May of 1932 
and in the midst of the Great Depression, he wrote a personally reflective 
letter to the Harvard Business School’s Georges F. Doriot. In his letter to 
Doroit, who later came to be known as the father of venture capital, Berle 
observed, “Theoretical finance without contact down town becomes 
theology. Financial practice without the theory (as at present run) is simply 
                                                     
 16. GUY ALCHON, THE INVISIBLE HAND OF PLANNING: CAPITALISM, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE 
STATE IN THE 1920S, at 3 (1985). 
 17. On Hoover, the Associational State, and the role of firms and corporations, see id.; 
HENDRICKSON, supra note 11, at 35–77; Ellis W. Hawley, Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, 
and the Vision of an ‘Associative State,’ 1921–1928, 61 J. AM. HIST. 1, 116–40 (1974). 
 18. JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 
23 (1987). 
2019] Adolf A. Berle and the Modern Corporation  367 
grotesque and accounts considerably for the mess we are in.”19 Berle 
thrived in moments when he could work at the intersection of the 
theoretical world of academia and the actual practicing of law. As the 
nation spiraled deeper into the Great Depression, he deduced that the 
artificial separation between theory and practice accounted in no small 
measure for the nation’s troubles. Doroit relished Berle’s observations 
about the dangers of separating theory from practice and, with obvious 
delight, wrote that he, along with his colleague Dr. Isaacs, had agreed to 
“change the motto on top of our Library and have chiseled in the stone” 
Berle’s quotation: “Theoretical finance without contact down town 
becomes theology.”20 
This desire to link up theory, empirical research, and practice came 
easily to Berle, who built a career at the crossroads of policy, research, and 
reform. And he hardly operated alone. During the 1920s, or the “New 
Era,” many politicians and theorists tried to use tools of social science and 
empirical research to solve a plethora of public problems. In the wake of 
post-war unemployment and inflation, for instance, Secretary of 
Commerce Herbert Hoover collaborated with the NBER’s Wesley M. 
Mitchell and Edwin Gay to organize a conference to examine the causes 
of economic instability. Their work helped to bring the business cycle into 
clearer view. 
In other cases and investigations, the focus shifted to the relationship 
between labor and capital. In the first three decades of the twentieth 
century, some employers experimented with various means of bringing 
some measure of democracy to American industry. To assess the veracity 
of these efforts, Mary Van Kleeck of the Russell Sage Foundation led a 
multi-year investigation that revealed marked deficiencies in these efforts 
(see cartoon at left below).21 And, in yet another case, when workers at 
U.S. Steel struck in an effort to demand the repeal of the twelve-hour day 
in the steel industry during the post-war strike wave, they failed. But soon 
after, Hoover helped convene a group of experts who produced a report 
for public consumption that found dramatic inefficiencies and injustices in 
the long workday. The report and public pressure led U.S. Steel to 
implement the shorter eight-hour day (see cartoon at right below). And 
when the war revealed gross inadequacies in the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’s collection and data processing methods, the Bureau turned to 
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the NBER’s Wesley Mitchell for critical guidance that led to the 
reorganization of the Bureau’s work.22 
 
 
These are two widely circulated cartoons from the era that provide 
evidence of some of the means by which inquiry and expertise shaped 
the public’s understanding of economic issues and policies. At left, 
the research or “report” of the Russell Sage Foundation knocks the 
hat off of the Rockefeller Industrial Plan while union labor looks on. 
In the wake of the Ludlow massacre and an investigation by the U.S. 
Commission on Industrial Relations that laid bare outrageous labor 
policies in Rockefeller-owned coal mines and steel works, John D. 
Rockefeller, Jr. worked with W. L. Mackenzie King to develop a 
labor-management system. This system aspired to apply “the 
mechanism of republican government in political life” to the steel and 
coal industry.23 At right, public opinion—informed by a report by the 
Federated American Engineering Society conducted at the request of 
Secretary of Commerce Hoover—hammers “Gary” into the shape of 
an eight. Judge Gary headed the United States Steel Corporation, 
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which claimed the eight-hour day unworkable in continuous 
operating industries like steel.24 
Berle joined in these efforts. In the years between WWI and 1923, he 
moved in a number of different intellectual and policy circles. He was, as 
Schwarz observed, “[a] clever man bent upon capturing the ears of men of 
power.” Berle, Schwarz quipped, “inevitably would be somebody’s 
‘braintruster.’”25 During the war, Berle served in the U.S. Army in the 
Dominican Republic where he worked to address one of the many 
commodity shortages that emerged during the war. While some 
government agencies sought to secure commodities like tungsten for steel 
production or nitrates for munitions and fertilizer, Berle worked to 
maintain supply chains for sugar.26 
With the end of hostilities, Berle managed to convince the U.S. Army 
that he had expertise in Russian economics, so they sent him to Paris where 
he joined the likes of Bernard Baruch, Hoover, Walter Lippman, and other 
current and future luminaries.27 When discharged from the Military 
Intelligence Division in June of 1919, Berle took up Keynes’s critique of 
the Paris Peace Treaty and began to build a resume as a foreign policy 
expert in the pages of The Nation and the New Republic that would serve 
him well later in his career. In the years after the war, Berle expanded his 
social network and further extended the issues on which he spoke and 
wrote with authority. He developed a close friendship with Lillian D. Wald 
while he lived near and worked with the Henry Street Settlement on New 
York’s Lower East Side. By way of his involvement with the American 
Indian Defense Association, Berle worked to protect the rights of the 
Pueblo Indians.28 He sought to reach a broad audience by way of an article 
in the Nation and several articles in the New Republic (three articles) and 
Survey (twelve articles).29 All of these pieces appeared between 1919 and 
1922, and they dealt with a range of issues including the League of 
Nations, U.S. involvement in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, 
and various labor, foreign policy, and progressive causes. 
The destruction of WWI and the often violent post-war domestic 
unrest set the agenda for many intellectuals and experts like Berle. In the 
wake of these catastrophic events, they worked sometimes collectively and 
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at times alone to try to puzzle out a less cataclysmic path forward.30 In a 
published New Republic article, and in an earlier version that The Nation 
rejected, Berle narrated the ongoing labor–capital conflict and argued that 
the nation stood at a hinge point. “Will there be a revolution in America?” 
Berle asked. “The answer is yes; undoubtedly; perhaps the quicker the 
better.” The precise manifestation of the impending revolution, Berle 
suggested, is unknown and contingent “depending on the kind and quality 
of brains at work.”31 In the American case, Berle noted that the traditional 
weapons of conflict—troops, armed guards, violence, injunctions, and 
strikes—had all been rolled out in the recent unrest.32 Raising the stakes, 
Berle, like others in the period, situated the American strife in a global 
context nodding, in particular, to events unfolding in Russia and Italy. 
Such fraught times called for original thinking, and Berle had a plan that 
conformed nicely to the New Era associational impulse in policymaking. 
The new industrial system Berle imagined eschewed a more robust role 
for the state and instead built on the premise that reform should be rooted 
in ensuring that investors, managers, and operators all had some skin in 
the game when it came to firm and plant level decisions. 33 
The problem that Berle identified turned on the recent trend that 
disempowered investors and workers. This left important decisions to 
managers who risked other people’s capital yet bore little risk if the 
business failed. Berle aimed to shift the “speculative hope, the chance, the 
possibilities” of profit from speculators who bought common stock but 
held no operational control to the operators—both labor and 
management—of the actual firm, factory, or plant.34 Whereas some 
progressives and reformers hoped statist wartime policies would continue 
into the post-war era, Berle stressed that a tighter link between risk and 
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actual operation would lead to a more efficient, more stable, more fair, and 
more productive system of production.35 
Berle identified two different classes of investors in modern 
corporations; in the post-revolutionary world he imagined, each class 
would receive a reward consistent with what they risked and what they 
contributed to the production process. One group invested not only 
financial capital in the corporation but also demonstrated an interest in 
adding additional value to the corporation by “throwing in brains and 
judgment and skill with their money.”36 A second class and, in Berle’s 
assessment, a “larger proportion” of investors, “merely buy, hope, hold 
and cash in when they can, reaping where they did not sow.”37 This latter 
group, he judged, deserved only a return on their investment equal to the 
current rate of interest. Berle argued that any amount of money that went 
to this later class above current interest rates amounted to a theft by the 
passive investor class from the individual who “did not get all he earned,” 
namely the “men who worked in the corporation’s mills or mines.”38 Here, 
he appealed not just to labor but also to active managers. When it came to 
the distribution of power in this new model, the percentage of common 
stock ownership going to the manager would be greater than that of an 
unskilled worker, which would give management greater authority over 
the decision-making. Holders of bonds, notes, and preferred stock would 
also find representation on the board of directors, but the voting power of 
the workers and managers who held the company’s common stock would 
always trump that of these other bodies. Investment capital could still 
come from the sale of preferred stock, and should the company be plainly 
mismanaged, mechanisms existed in Berle’s system for holders of 
preferred stock to intervene. If the central problem of the post-war era that 
Berle identified was labor–capital conflict, then the solution he proposed 
turned not on expanding the power of the government but instead on the 
necessity of displacing the current group of stockholders who seemed to 
care little for the actual operation of the company.39 
Berle’s advocacy of anti-imperialist policies and his interest in 
shareholder rights came together in the case of the Virgin Islands. In the 
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1920s, Berle served as counsel for St. Thomas and St. Croix and 
represented the islands in Congress when the Senate Committee on Insular 
Affairs heard arguments for replacing the U.S. Navy government with a 
permanent government “more in keeping with American democratic 
ideals.”40 In 1922, Berle met Rothschild Francis, who, along with others, 
was in New York to advocate for a permanent government for the islands. 
This issue received national attention, but it got particular traction with 
civil rights and civil liberties groups. For instance, in February 1924, Berle 
and Francis were joined in a New York rally advocating a permanent 
government for the Virgin Islands by labor leader A. Philip Randolph; St. 
Croix native and Randolph ally, Frank Crosswaith; and a longtime ally of 
Berle, the American Civil Liberties Union’s director, Roger Baldwin. As 
a group, they advocated the establishment of a civil government for the 
islands, full rights of citizenship, and the removal of barriers of trade.41 
In the case of the Virgin Islands, Berle asserted himself as an 
advocate and burnished his reputation as an “expert,” but the experience 
also provided an opportunity to experiment with the ways of reshaping the 
ownership structure of an enterprise in a way that more tightly linked 
ownership and control. In late 1922 and early 1923, Francis and Berle 
proposed a massive reorganization of the Islands Sugar Company in St. 
Croix. In November of 1922, Berle constructed a plan “to provide suitable 
corporate machinery to enable the St. Croix Labor Union” to control the 
company’s sugar properties.42 The basic idea was to form a small 
corporation, chartered perhaps in Delaware, and then for the corporation 
to own the sugar producing lands. All of the stock in this new corporation 
would then be turned over to the union, who would in turn elect the 
corporation’s board of directors. The officers of the union, Berle proposed, 
would elect the directors of the corporation, which might include local 
bankers or technical advisors in addition to union men. The advantages of 
this organization would include limited liability for individual union 
members and the ability of the new corporation to pay dividends to the 
owners of the corporation—i.e., union members.43 Francis returned to St. 
Croix in January of 1923 and wrote Berle that “several prominent 
politicians and labor leaders are in sympathy with the draft,” and that he 
planned to print some two thousand copies to better inform the population 
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about the nature of the plan.44 It is not clear if Berle and Francis ever 
implemented this planned corporate organization, but Berle’s work on it 
suggests the degree to which he worked to connect his evolving theoretical 
ideas to what unfolded “downtown” or, in this case, the fields. 
III. FACILITATING INQUIRY IN THE AGE OF THE ASSOCIATIONAL STATE 
During the WWI era, a number of long-simmering economic and 
social issues erupted, but instability and unrest did not alone guarantee the 
unprecedented and multi-pronged outpouring of research and inquiry that 
followed. Part of impetus for this work can be traced back to Hoover’s 
efforts, but Hoover and his allies found willing partners in the burgeoning 
nonprofit and nongovernmental sector that flourished in the New Era. 
Institutions such as the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF [1907]) (founding 
dates listed in brackets), the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER [1920]), the National Industrial Conferences Board (NICB 
[1916]), and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC [1923]) were 
among the influential sites of inquiry that emerged in highly uncertain and 
contingent times. These efforts were funded by various foundations, such 
as the RSF (which both conducted and funded research), the Laura 
Spellman Rockefeller Memorial [1918], the Twentieth Century Fund 
[1919], and the Rockefeller Foundation [1913]. They worked to advance 
an understanding of the consequences of living in an increasingly urban, 
consumer, and diverse society. An impressive stream of still important 
studies emerged from these efforts. In addition to The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property and the already-mentioned RSF studies 
led by Van Kleeck, these institutions funded many major inquiries from 
this period including: Recent Social Trends, Paul Taylor’s multi-volume 
Mexican Labor in the United States, Robert and Helen Lynd’s 
Middletown: A Study in Modern American Culture, and a number of works 
funded by the National Bureau of Economic Research and the also newly 
created Brookings Institution. 
The mission and the work of the SSRC in the 1920s deserve special 
mention as it funded not just Berle and Means’s work but also many New 
Era inquiries. University of Chicago political scientist Charles E. Merriam 
first proposed the council’s creation in the early 1920s as a means of 
generating a “new synthesis of knowledge.”45 Merriam found in the 
NBER’s Wesley Clair Mitchell a willing ally, but ideas and friends don’t 
fund a fledgling institution. The recently founded Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial initially focused on providing funding for medical 
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research, but under the leadership of its young director, University of 
Chicago Ph.D. Beardsley Ruml, it expanded its purview into the social 
sciences. If the war revealed a lack of state capacity in the federal 
government, Ruml found little to celebrate in the state of the post-war 
social sciences. In the fall of 1922, he argued that those who wanted to 
pursue the public interest were all “embarrassed” by the lack of 
“knowledge that the social sciences provide.”46 With an endowment of $74 
million under his control at LSRM, Ruml had the means to take steps to 
remedy this problem.47 In 1927, the LSRM provided the initial $750,000 
to start the SSRC, and within ten years the council provided well over $4 
million in awards to support research in the social sciences.48 
The initial intellectual agenda of the SSRC—and specifically its 
Committee on Problems and Policy that set the agenda and the council’s 
direction—did not lend itself immediately to the issues Berle and Means 
addressed. Decisions on direction and funding allocation usually happened 
in the late summer or early fall when the SSRC’s Problems and Policy 
committee met in Hanover, New Hampshire.49 At their first meeting in 
1925, the committee identified several fruitful areas of inquiry, including 
the family, immigration from Mexico, internal migration (i.e., the early 
stages of the Great Migration), race relations, agricultural economics, and 
the Eighteenth Amendment.50 
The SSRC’s list of lines of inquiry in the mid-1920s leaned away 
from concerns over industrial democracy, labor–capital conflict, and the 
economic instability that had characterized important aspects of Berle and 
other investigators’ work in the immediate wake of WWI. Part of the 
reason for this shift likely had to do with extremely uneven, but still 
important, prosperity that followed the 1920–1921 “V-shaped” 
recession.51 By the mid-1920s, even strong advocates for more statist labor 
legislation recognized that real wages had increased significantly since the 
war. For instance, in a 1926 article for the American Economic Review, 
prominent advocate for the family wage and University of Chicago 
economist Paul Douglas, described not only an increase in real wages but 
also other factors (such as smaller working-class families, an increase in 
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the number of wage earners per household, shorter working days, and 
increased access to social services) that increased the economic well-being 
of working-class families.52 A dramatic decline in labor unrest, increased 
access to electricity, and increased access to consumer credit were among 
the many factors that led social and economic investigators to pursue new 
lines of inquiry. 
If concerns over industrial democracy faded in the mid-1920s, other 
changes underway enhanced the relevance of the questions Berle 
entertained. Lingering employer concerns from the post-war period of 
labor unrest combined with a new focus on labor turnover (brought on in 
part by plummeting levels of immigration) led to a number of different 
experiments in labor–management relations.53 These ranged from the type 
of plans Van Kleeck and the RSF investigated, which tried to bring a 
measure of democracy to industry, to welfare capitalist plans that built on 
a longer paternalistic tradition in worker–employer relations. Some of 
these plans provided workers with company stock as a form of 
compensation in hopes that employees would come to see their own 
personal interests aligned with that of the company. Indeed, as the NICB 
revealed in a 1928 study, the 1920s witnessed a dramatic increase in the 
number of companies instituting stock purchasing plans.54 
The employee stock-ownership angle increased the relevance of 
Berle’s proposed study, but his proposed methodology of bringing into 
conversation law and economics also resonated deeply with the goals of 
the SSRC. Having a close and powerful ally on the council helped, too. 
After several years of research and writing in which he described the ways 
that managers appropriated power over the modern corporation from 
shareholders, Berle reached out to the SSRC with a proposal for a larger 
study that he initially entitled A Study of the Trends of Recent Corporate 
Development. Although the specific topic may not have immediately 
resonated with Problems and Policy Committee, the proposal’s emphasis 
on interrogating the modern corporation using both the tools of law and 
economics fit nicely with the SSRC’s broader emphasis on integrating the 
social sciences in ways that used interdisciplinary tools to address modern 
problems. In August of 1927, the council agreed to fund Berle’s project. 
Berle credited Gay above all others in shaping The Modern Corporation 
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and Private Property. “The existence of this study is in large measure due 
to Edwin F. Gay of Harvard,” who, Berle wrote in the original preface to 
the text, “molded into concrete form the suggestion that work should be 
done in this field.”55 
IV. “GROPING FOR A KIND OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  
OF ECONOMIC GOVERNMENT”56 
Between early 1929 and 1933, the U.S. economy went from the tail 
end of one of its longest boom periods to the bottom of the Great 
Depression. In these critical years, Berle sharpened his understanding of 
the underlying problems the nation faced, and he shifted his focus from 
the need to empower the shareholder to considering the potential for a 
much more robust role for the state in managing modern corporations. But 
aside from recommendations for shifting “control” from the private sector 
to the government, he—like many others in those anxious days—had 
much more trouble identifying the proper relationship between the state 
and the modern corporation. 
In the spring of 1929, Berle began to process Means’s incoming 
statistical findings. The evidence Means gathered painted a grim picture 
of an economy, where around two hundred corporations administered over 
one-third of the nation’s wealth. More alarming, less than eighteen 
hundred men dominated these corporations. Months before the stock 
market crash, Berle wrote to a friend that this alarming concentration was 
a “problem of government rather than finance.” The solution, he proposed, 
was one of “common law acting through equity,” which he described as  
the only instrument preventing this situation from turning itself in 
process of time into a more or less futile absolutism. . . . We thus are 
really groping for a kind of constitutional law of economic 
government permitting the flexibility and freedom of action required 
for successful business operations on the one hand; and at the same 
time, having sufficient rigidity of principle to protect the very large, 
unrepresented interests implicit in public security markets.57 
In the uncertain early days of the Great Depression, Berle of course 
would consult with FDR, but his correspondence reveals a collective effort 
by him, his friends, and his colleagues to think through a path forward. 
Just before Christmas in 1931, he received a letter from an old family 
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friend, George Weston Anderson. Anderson’s distinguished career 
included stints as United States Attorney for Massachusetts from 1914 to 
1917 and a one-year term on the Interstate Commerce Commission in 
1918. That same year, President Wilson nominated and the Senate 
confirmed Anderson as a judge on the First Circuit. On the bench, he spoke 
out strongly for civil liberties in the context of the post-war Red Scare and 
Palmer Raids.58 In October 1931 and one year before his retirement, 
Anderson penned a letter to Berle in hopes of getting the younger man’s 
thoughts on the idea of federal incorporation.59 In his response to this 
initial letter and in ensuing correspondence, Berle outlined some of the 
central problems that he and others tried to puzzle out in the face of 
economic turmoil. 
To frame the depression, Berle again constructed a narrative of 
American economic history just as he had done in the New Republic piece 
more than a decade earlier. In this case, he conceived of the present 
moment as yet another hinge point in the nation’s development. In the 
process, he worked out some of the central ideas that would go into FDR’s 
famous Commonwealth Speech, which the future president delivered in 
San Francisco nine months later, just days before the 1932 presidential 
election. According to Berle, 
Up to a short while ago the country was being built. It could 
tolerate the buccaneering of great finance because, in spite of the 
cruelty and the waste, a tremendous commercial plant emerged. I 
hold no brief for the morals of the men that achieved this; apparently, 
however, society wanted the result badly enough to accept the 
methods. 
Today with a finished plant the job is to shift from promoting 
into administration.60 
A glance back at the dramatic labor–capital conflict that had 
accompanied the rise of this great “commercial plant” should have 
tempered any claims that society “accepted” the buccaneers’ methods, but 
nonetheless, Berle argued that the main problem the nation currently 
confronted turned on the “the great corporate structure.” He entertained 
Anderson’s suggestion of federal incorporation, but he thought similar 
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results could be brought about by empowering the Federal Trade 
Commission to more rigorously enforce standards on all businesses 
engaged in interstate trade. To anticipated charges that this amounted to 
little more than socialism, Berle argued that if the choice was between “a 
system run by somebody and a system run by nobody, I am all for the 
former no matter what name you tack on it.” Further, if the choice came 
down to a system run by “the Government or National City Bank,” he 
would choose the former “every time.”61 The lack of some means of 
controlling the economic system vexed Berle. By March of the next year, 
Berle recommended to writer and book reviewer Lewis Gannett the just-
published book Is Capitalism Doomed? by Lawrence Dennis. Dennis’s 
book, Berle noted, was the first to argue “that an uncontrolled system, like 
our own, in the long pull is headed for a smashup.” “I think there is no 
escape from the logic and no escape from the result except by retarding 
the line of development,” Berle concluded.62 He assessed the book as 
“probably the best contribution to economic thinking since John Maynard 
Keynes’ Economic Consequences of Peace.”63 
Acknowledging the need for some “control” in times as perilous as 
the Great Depression was one thing but identifying a plan was still another. 
In early 1932, and several months before the publication of The Modern 
Corporations and Private Property, Berle struggled in private to articulate 
what this system would look like. In fact, just five days after he sent that 
letter to Anderson, he sent Louis Brandeis a letter ostensibly to offer a 
much-belated response to a letter and picture sent the previous year. After 
three paragraphs of small talk, Berle got to what appears to be the letter’s 
main purpose. He mentioned that he had recently re-read the Justice’s 
writings concerning the dangers of corporate concentration, his opposition 
to it, and his recommendation that these enormous economic entities 
needed to be broken up. “You were writing in 1915,” Berle wrote to 
Brandeis, who, as the author, hardly needed reminding of the year in which 
he wrote. For whatever reason, Berle could not bring himself to actually 
ask Brandeis straight away if he still believed what he had written nearly 
two decades earlier. Instead, and perhaps hoping to solicit some response, 
he outlined his own position by way of yet another narrative that framed 
recent developments: 
Now the concentration has progressed so far that it seems unlikely to 
break up even in a period of stress. I can see nothing at the moment 
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but to take this trend as it stands endeavoring to mold it so as to be 
useful. If the next phase is to be virtually a non-political economic 
government by mass industrial forces, possibly something can be 
done to make such government responsible, sensitive, and actuated 
primarily by the necessity of serving the millions of little people 
whose lives it employs, whose savings it takes in guard, and whose 
materials of life it apparently has to provide.64 
Berle would come to embrace and defend what Schwarz describes as 
the “state capitalism” of the New Deal, but in early 1932, his call for a 
“non-political economic government by mass industrial forces” seems 
more in line with an associational vision of the New Era than the more 
statist vision of the New Deal. 
In the wake of Roosevelt’s election, and now as a trusted “brain 
truster,” Berle elaborated on his evolving understanding of the problems 
posed by the modern corporation. Yet, he seemed no closer to coming to 
a method of controlling the corporation in a manner that protected the 
public interest and satisfied his own ideological preference for more 
associational solutions to economic problems. Like Brandeis, bigness 
concerned him, but going back to an earlier era of a world dominated by 
smaller enterprises seemed, to Berle, an improbable way forward. Instead, 
he indicated that he was “working on . . . a vague dream that the 
commercial organizations which we have built up may be used, more or 
less as they stand, without being destroyed, in the public interest.” 
“Surely,” he hoped, “there must be the middle ground which permits 
individuals to fulfill themselves in their lives, without leaving the bulk of 
the population merely the sport or prey of passing economic ambition.”65 
What that system would look like remained very much an open question 
for Berle. In the spring of 1929, and before the full effect of the Great 
Depression took hold, Berle wrote that as a nation we were “groping for a 
kind of constitutional law of economic government.”66 Four and a half 
years later and now at the trough of the Great Depression, Berle returned 
to that (rather cringe-worthy) verb and assessed the New Deal as a work 
in progress in the pages of the Survey Graphic: “The NRA,” he wrote “is 
the first step, groping perhaps, but nevertheless of extreme significance 
toward” reaching the goal of a stable economy that provided for all of its 
citizens.67 
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It is telling that even as The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property gained traction after its publication in July 1932, Berle joined an 
effort to again bridge his academic work to reforms downtown using the 
tools of the associational state. He joined an effort spearheaded by Adrian 
Vere Shaw to create a voluntary, non-profit association “for the protection 
and advancement” of American investors. In this initial effort, Berle and 
Shaw were joined by a group of notable experts from a number of different 
fields, including efficiency expert and mechanical engineer L. P. Alford, 
University of Chicago economist and future U.S. Senator Paul Douglass, 
and economist Virgil Jordan, who headed the National Industrial 
Conference Board. The organizing document for the association reads not 
like a recipe for state capitalism but instead like a framework for using the 
tools of the associational state to solve public problems. The proposed 
organization would “compile complete and unbiased information” in 
hopes of educating “members, the public, corporate executives and 
financial practices” as to “what constitutes the best investment standards,” 
“abuses and means of overcoming them,” and “improvements and means 
of accomplishing them.” Even the initial seed money sought for the effort 
had a decidedly New Era bent with Edward Filene and the Twentieth 
Century Fund—a foundation for which Berle would serve as chairman of 
the Board of Trustees later in life and with which he remained involved 
from the 1930s until his death—identified by Shaw as “taking a real 
interest in this movement” and likely to provide the funding to get the 
association up and running.68 
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Photo accompanied a September 21, 1952, New York Times article 
by Berle. The caption reads, “The real American capitalist can be 
found at stockholders’ meetings. Here one is shown exercising his 
democratic right to speak up to company officers.” While the man 
speaks, a large number of women shareholders look on.69 
CONCLUSION 
Berle was a public figure of undeniable importance, but his 
ideological and philosophical beliefs are often hard to pin down. No doubt, 
he embraced and defended many New Deal statist policies after 1933, but 
when it came to controlling the modern corporation, statist solutions 
always seemed like an uneasy fit for an intellectual who before the New 
Deal seemed more ideologically at ease with associational solutions. It is 
impossible to tell, but perhaps his inability to arrive at a clear policy 
prognosis for controlling the modern corporation in the New Deal era can 
be explained by the fact that he never really believed that there was a 
robust role for the state in the management of corporate affairs. 
What we do know is that by the 1950s, Berle moved in quite a 
different direction on issues of economic power, the modern corporation, 
and the state. He, as Schwarz notes, continued to be concerned about 
concentration, but he now contended that corporate leaders had gained a 
sense of social responsibility that “made him optimistic about the future 
of economic democracy in a capitalist society.” In the realm of corporate 
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ownership, Berle saw pension funds as important players who were 
“socializing” property ownership and creating a “peoples’ capitalism.”70 
In this later period, Berle celebrated the American company officer, the 
diffusion of ownership of corporations, and the marginal role of the 
American state in the activities of the modern corporation. Always quick 
to construct a narrative, Berle dismissed communist critiques of American 
capitalists as antiquated; they were writing about an economic system that 
had passed some fifty years ago. “Fifty years ago,” he argued, “American 
corporations did have identifiable ‘owners.’ These died, split up their 
holdings, paid inheritance taxes, sold out, gave away their fortunes, and 
otherwise dispersed.” Since the turn of the century merger movement, a 
more and more dispersed ownership structure displaced the proprietary 
capitalists’ dominance of industry. To find the new owners or the new 
capitalists, Berle suggested critics of American capitalism look to the 86 
million insurance holders and 6.5 million stockholders of the nation. They 
were the owners of the modern corporation.71 
Berle took pride in what he believed was his and his generation’s role 
in bringing about a “peoples’ capitalism.” And his assessment of these 
accomplishments was at least partially merited, but at the very moment he 
celebrated the achievement of post-war American capitalism, a second 
wave of foundations and think tanks began emerging that had a far 
different agenda than the RSF, SSRC, LSRM, Twentieth Century Fund, 
and other organizations that emerged in the early years of the twentieth 
century. This new phalanx of institutions came peopled with individuals 
bent on turning back key New Deal and Great Society public policies and 
articulating a clear defense of the market and the free enterprise system as 
they understood it.72 Coincidentally, or maybe ironically, 1971—the year 
of Berle’s death—marked not just the starting point for the upward trend 
in wealth and income inequality that in many respects defines the United 
States today, but it was also the year that future Supreme Court Justice 
Lewis Powell penned his memorandum to the Chamber of Commerce 
advising investment by conservative foundations in like-minded think 
tanks and policy institutes.73 
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Due in no small measure to these efforts, we live in a world where, 
as Daniel T. Rodgers has pointed out, “the market” is seen as the most 
efficient and appropriate means of making complex economic decisions.74 
The Berle of the 1950s drifted toward the idea that corporate officials, with 
some oversight from stockholders, were effectively regulating themselves 
in the public interest. But even this rose-colored view of American 
capitalism recognized that there had to be some force—at the very least 
stockholders or far-sighted company officials—who could look out for the 
public interest. Even in the prosperous years of the New Era and the 
booming 1950s, policy makers would have found confidence in something 
as amorphous as “the market” a curious concept on which to latch the 
economic future of the nation. 
 
                                                     
churches, state houses, media outlets, and beyond. The Powell Memo amounted to a call to arms for 
business leaders and conservative groups who constructed organizations like the Heritage Foundation, 
Cato Institute, and Manhattan Institute, among others, to confront the statist and even socialist 
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when industrial leaders and philanthropists poured resources into an earlier group of institutions 
devoted to making sense of the dramatic changes underway in American society in the first decades 
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